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Abstract
Over the past two decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal
system handles most family disputes – particularly disputes involving children. This
paradigm shift has replaced the law-oriented and judge-focused model of adjudication
with a more collaborative, interdisciplinary and forward-looking family dispute
resolution regime. It has also transformed the practice of family law and fundamentally
altered the way in which disputing families interact with the legal system. This essay
examines the elements of this paradigm shift in family dispute resolution and explores the
opportunities and challenges it offers for families, children and the legal system.
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Over the past two decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal
system handles most family disputes – particularly disputes involving children. This
paradigm shift has replaced the law-oriented and judge-focused adversary model with a
more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and forward-looking family dispute resolution
regime. It has also transformed the practice of family law and fundamentally altered the
way in which disputing families interact with the legal system. Although this “velvet
revolution” in family conflict resolution offers many potential benefits for children and
for parents, it also poses a number of challenges – both for families and for the judicial
system. In this essay, I describe the contours of this paradigm shift and explain why I
think it may be a double-edged sword.
I. Elements of the Paradigm Shift
The paradigm shift in family dispute resolution encompasses a number of related
components. The first component is a profound skepticism about the value of traditional
adversary procedures. An overriding theme of recent divorce reform efforts is that
adversary processes are ill-suited for resolving disputes involving children.2 Relatedly,
social science suggests that children’s adjustment to divorce and separation depends
significantly on their parents’ behavior during and after the separation process: the higher
the levels of parental conflict to which children are exposed, the more negative the effects
of family dissolution.3 Armed with these social science findings, academics and court
reformers have argued that family courts should abandon the adversary paradigm, in
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favor of approaches that help parents manage their conflict and encourage them to
develop positive post-divorce co-parenting relationships.4
Family courts across the country have embraced this insight and have adopted an
array of non-adversary dispute resolution mechanisms designed to avoid adjudication of
family cases.5 This rejection of adversary procedures has moved beyond divorce-related
custody disputes -- where court-connected mediation is now the norm6 -- to the more
‘public’ arena of state-initiated child welfare proceedings, where family group
conferencing and other problem-solving approaches have begun to supplant more
traditional adjudicative models.7 An increasing number of family lawyers have also
rejected the adversary paradigm, in favor of a “collaborative law” model under which
lawyers pledge at the outset of their representation not to take a client’s case to trial.8 As
two leading reformers recently stated, “in the last quarter century, the process of
resolving legal family disputes has, both literally and metaphorically, moved from
confrontation toward collaboration and from the courtroom to the conference room.”9
A second element of the paradigm shift in family dispute resolution is the belief
that most family disputes are not discrete legal events, but ongoing social and emotional
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processes.10 This de-legalization of family disputes began with the shift from fault-based
to no-fault divorce; more recently, it has become one of the basic tenets of the movement
for unified family courts.11 Thus recharacterized, family disputes call not for zealously
legal approaches, but for interventions that are collaborative, holistic, and
interdisciplinary, since these are the types of interventions most likely to address the
families’ underlying dysfunction and emotional needs.12 Understanding family conflict as
primarily a social and emotional process, rather than a legal event, also reduces the
primacy of lawyers in handling these disputes and enhances the role of non-legal
professionals in the family court system.
Third, this new understanding of family disputes has led to a reformulation of the
goal of legal intervention in the family. Traditionally, legal intervention was a backwardlooking process, designed primarily to assign blame and allocate rights; under the new
paradigm, by contrast, judges assume the forward looking task of supervising a process
of family reorganization. As Andrew Schepard has noted, family court judges no longer
function primarily as fault-finders or rights adjudicators, but rather as ongoing conflict
managers.13
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement embodies this forward-looking
orientation. From a therapeutic perspective, legal intervention in the family strives not
merely to resolve disputes, but to improve the material and psychological well being of
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individuals and families in conflict.14 Problem-solving judges embrace this therapeutic
role by attempting to understand and address underlying family dynamics and by using
judicial authority “to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to monitor their
compliance and progress.”15
Fourth, to achieve these therapeutic goals, family courts have adopted systems
that de-emphasize third-party dispute resolution in favor of capacity-building processes
that seek to empower families to resolve their own conflicts. Consistent with this
philosophy, jurisdictions across the country have instituted mandatory divorce-related
parenting education and other programs designed to enhance litigants’ communication
and problem-solving skills.16 Similarly, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution endorses individualized parenting plans as an alternative to
judicial custody rulings and urges the adoption of court-based programs that facilitate
these voluntary agreements.17 A number of jurisdictions have made such parenting plans
a central feature of their divorce and custody regimes.18 More recently, a number of
family courts have added “parenting coordinators” to their staffs; these quasi-judicial
officials assist high conflict families to develop concrete parenting plans and to resolve
ongoing parenting disputes that arise under these plans.19
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A fifth component of the paradigm shift is an increased emphasis on pre-dispute
planning and preventive law.20 Familiar examples include the increased acceptance and
enforceability of prenuptial agreements and domestic partnership contracts.21 Parenting
plans that include a mechanism for periodic review or a process for resolving future
disagreements are similarly designed to minimize the need for future court intervention.
More recently, a number of commentators have advocated a similar, preventive approach
to determining, prior to a child’s birth, the parental status of a non-biologically-related
adult who anticipates caring for the child.22 Perhaps more ambitiously, a few states have
considered broad-based pre-marriage education requirements as a prerequisite for
obtaining a marriage license, and the federal government has invested substantial
resources in public and private marriage education programs aimed especially at low
income partners.23 More generally, scholars and advocates of “preventive law” have
urged individuals to use legal mechanisms to anticipate and plan for family transitions
such as the formation and dissolution of intimate partnerships.24 This emphasis on
publicly-supervised private ordering creates a hybrid model that expands the role of
family courts and lawyers beyond their traditional dispute-resolution function. It also
extends the time frame during which families interact with the legal system.
Preventive law has been defined as "a branch of law that endeavors to minimize the risk of litigation or
to secure more certainty as to legal rights and duties." Hon. Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and
the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1995). It emphasizes the lawyer's role as a
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Taken together, these developments hold considerable promise for families.
Non-adversary dispute resolution procedures offer families a mode of conflict resolution
that is both more enduring and less destructive of ongoing relationships than adversary
litigation.25 Non-adversary processes are also more amenable to direct participation by
family members – a particularly important feature, given the high percentage of family
litigants who are not represented by counsel.26 Similarly, judicial interventions that
successfully build capacity and enhance problem-solving skills should allow families to
avoid the financial and emotional drain of future encounters with the legal system. On a
more theoretical level, the paradigm shift in family dispute resolution appropriately
rejects the mythology of the private family – a mythology that characterizes “normal”
families as fully autonomous and self-sufficient and that labels families that seek – or are
subject to -- state intervention as dysfunctional or inadequate. The new paradigm
recognizes instead that family and state governance are intertwined and that most families
need public support in order to function effectively.
II. Concerns and Cautionary Notes
Despite the positive potential of these developments, the paradigm shift in family
dispute resolution also raises a number of concerns. One concern highlights the tension
between the ideology of post-divorce co-parenting and the clean-break philosophy that
underlies no-fault divorce. The new dispute resolution paradigm is committed to shared
parenting after divorce or separation, based on the core premise that while divorce may
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terminate the spousal bond, it does not dissolve the parenting partnership.27 In popular
parlance, “parents are forever.”28 This commitment to shared parenting is reflected not
only in the increasingly common statutory preference for post-divorce custody
arrangements that facilitate close and continuing contact with both parents, but also in the
parenting arrangements actually produced.29 Joint physical custody arrangements are
much more common today than in the past – accounting for approximately 15% of all
custody outcomes in a recent empirical study.30 Joint legal custody is considerably more
prevalent; it gives divorced parents equal and shared legal authority to make major
decisions about the children’s lives, regardless of where the children live. Such equal
decision-making arrangements are now the norm in many jurisdictions.31 For example, a
recent study of child custody outcomes in North Carolina indicated that almost 70% of all
custody resolutions included joint legal custody, as did over 90% of all mediated custody
agreements.32 Other studies show similar trends. Even the ALI Principles contain a
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presumption in favor of joint legal custody33 -- a presumption that has been largely
overlooked by commentators who have focused instead on the Principles’ endorsement of
past caretaking functions as a basis for allocating (physical) custodial responsibility.34
This commitment to shared post-divorce parenting contrasts sharply with the
clean break philosophy that governs the post-divorce relationship of ex-spouses and the
financial consequences of divorce. Under the prevailing economic clean break model,
“divorced persons and cohabitants who part ways are entirely separate individuals,
unencumbered by ongoing legal or financial relationships, free to build new lives and
make a fresh start.”35 In particular, alimony and other forms of post-divorce income
sharing are dis-favored, and economic disadvantages that arise – or are perceived to arise
–from post-separation events are irrelevant to the parties’ ongoing financial
relationship.36 Individual autonomy and the opportunity to make a fresh start are the
overriding values in the economic and emotional spheres. By contrast, post-divorce coparenting requires that divorced and separated individuals remain deeply involved in each
other’s lives. A commitment to shared post-divorced parenting also limits the autonomy
and decision-making authority of former spouses, not just with respect to children, but
with respect to other aspects of their lives, particularly for residential parents. This
largely unacknowledged tension sends a decidedly mixed message to divorcing and
separating parents – your emotional and economic partnership is over, but your parenting
relationship remains intact.
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Moreover, the consequences of this mixed message are highly gendered. As the
primary caretakers of children –both before and after divorce –women are likely to be
doubly disadvantaged by the disconnect between post-divorce economic norms and postdivorce parenting expectations – first by the dissolution of the couple’s economic
partnership and then by the decision-making restrictions that accompany judicially–
mandated post-divorce co-parenting.37 Relocation law and practice illustrates this
gendered impact.38 Post-divorce relocation disputes have risen dramatically in recent
years.39 In many states, a divorced or separated parent who seeks to change a child’s
principal residence must first notify the other parent.40 If the non-residential parent does
not consent to the move, the residential parent must obtain judicial permission to
relocate.41 Often that permission is not forthcoming or is conditioned on the requesting
parent relinquishing primary residential custody.42 Significantly, while judges are
increasingly likely to restrict a residential parent’s ability to relocate, they rarely restrict
the mobility of a non-residential parent -- even one with joint legal custody and even
though the effect on a child of such a move may be just as dramatic and just as negative.
Nor do most courts consider the possibility of a non-residential parent following a
residential parent to a new locale when evaluating the residential parent’s request to
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move.43 Even when a court permits a residential parent to relocate, the court may allocate
to the relocating parent some or all of the additional costs for the non-relocating parent to
visit or otherwise stay in touch with the children.44 By contrast, courts that deny a
residential parent’s request to relocate do not compensate that parent for lost economic
opportunities.45
Moreover, joint custody arrangements – both legal and physical -- require parents
who are able to cooperate, plan and make decisions together.46 This may be an unrealistic
expectation for a significant percentage of post-divorce families, even with the assistance
of a parent coordinator – the most recent addition to the dispute resolution continuum in
many family courts.47 Most experts believe that the benefits of joint custody are
attenuated - and may be outweighed by the potential for harm - when parents are hostile
towards one another or simply cannot get along.48 Moreover, several studies suggest that
joint custody arrangements are particularly likely to change over time.49 To the extent
that these changes exacerbate conflict or require ongoing court intervention, the harm to
children may outweigh any benefits associated with legally mandated shared custody.
A dogged allegiance to post-divorce co-parenting may also conflict with our
commitment to family privacy. Principles of constitutional law, as well as traditional
family law doctrine, place a high value on parental autonomy and are wary about ongoing
43
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state involvement in family life.50 Parents who are subject to – or repeatedly seek – court
oversight of their parenting relationship risk jeopardizing this commitment to family
autonomy. When family disputes are viewed not as discrete legal events, but as
opportunities for therapeutic, holistic, and interdisciplinary interventions, such ongoing
state involvement in family life becomes disconcertingly easy to justify.
Another area of concern focuses on the institutional competence of courts.
Although families may benefit from the capacity-building and problem-solving
approaches embraced by the new paradigm, it is unclear whether courts are competent to
provide these services. Court-based procedures have historically been designed to
determine facts and enforce norms. The more comprehensive and forward-looking tasks
envisioned by the new paradigm call for very different judicial skill sets and institutional
capabilities. Even a restructured family court may be incapable of achieving the
formidable task of “improving the well-being and functioning of families and children.”51
Moreover, asking a court system to take on these tasks may detract from its
fundamental role as a forum for fair and authoritative dispute resolution.52 As several
commentators have noted, unified family courts share many of the goals and ambitions of
the turn-of-the century juvenile court movement, which endorsed therapeutic justice,
holistic intervention and an expanded role for the judiciary.53 But these earlier, seemingly
progressive reforms became increasingly oppressive for the children involved in the
juvenile court system, and the Supreme Court eventually invalidated many of them as
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violations of individual due process rights.54 Critics suggest that the “one judge— one
family” policy that underlies the new dispute-resolution paradigm may raise similar due
process concerns.55
Concentrating treatment resources in the court system may also detract from their
availability in the wider community and may create an undesirable shift from community
to court-based interventions. Such a shift may lead state authorities to file cases, and
individuals to submit to the court’s jurisdiction, in order to access services unavailable
elsewhere, creating a vicious cycle of dependence on court-connected intervention.56
Burgeoning family court dockets, coupled with declining state resources, present
a final set of concerns. To implement the new paradigm effectively, court systems will
need to recruit and train additional judicial and non-judicial staff. These include
mediators, parent educators, custody evaluators, parent coordinators and other quasijudicial officers. But resources available for family courts are declining, while their
caseloads continue to grow – due, in part, to increases in post-divorce parenting
disputes.57 As a result, scarce resources are spread even more thinly and courts may have
difficulty meeting both their basic adjudicative functions and the broader, more ambitious
goals of the new family conflict resolution paradigm.
Conclusion
So what lessons do I take from these concerns? Certainly not that they merit a
rejection of the new paradigm or a return to a full-fledged adversary regime. However,
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they do suggest that family court reformers should be mindful of the costs and unintended
consequences of even the most well-intentioned court interventions. Thus, in addition to
“fitting the forum to the family fuss,”58 reformers should make sure that the resolution
fits both the family and the judicial system. Post-divorce co-parenting is not for everyone;
nor is it the only way of ensuring that children maintain a meaningful relationship with
both parents. In particular, joint legal custody may be contraindicated where parents have
exhausted the dispute resolution continuum and are still unable to reach an agreement. In
other words, parents who insist on adjudication of their initial parenting dispute are
unlikely to be good candidates for future joint decision-making. Developing a more
disengaged “parallel parenting” strategy may be both more realistic and more beneficial
for them and their children.59
Finally, proponents of the new paradigm might consider “divorcing” some of the
services on the family dispute resolution continuum from the court system. A promising
model may be a recent reform effort in Australia that introduced community-based
“family relationship centres,” whose mission is to direct parenting disagreements away
from the court system entirely and into community based institutions.60 Those of us who
went to law school “to make a difference in people’s lives,” often look first to courtbased solutions to social problems. But sometimes the most effective solutions may lie
outside our jurisdiction.
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